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Abstract 
We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, 
possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this 
information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-
revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison 
between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties 
to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is 
communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit 
statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In 
contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of 
dishonesty. 
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1. Introduction 
Considerable work in behavioral economics explores strategic situations 
involving asymmetric information, in which one party can deceive the other (see for 
instance, Croson, et al., 2003, Gneezy 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), 
producing the overall result that most players do not lie. Such truth telling has typically 
been interpreted as ethical behavior (see e.g. Brandts & Charness, 2003).1 
Bargaining often contains informational asymmetries, opening doors for 
deception. For example, in employer-employee wage bargaining the employer can 
benefit by strategically misrepresenting the employee’s contribution. While there is an 
abundant experimental literature on bargaining with complete information about 
relevant game parameters, addressing mainly issues of social preferences, there are 
fewer papers examining bargaining under incomplete information.2 
We study deception in a simple (ultimatum) bargaining game with (one-sided) 
asymmetric information about the allocation over which the parties bargain (e.g., 
Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Güth, Huck, and Ockenfels, 1996; Kagel et al.,1996). Our 
focus is on comparing different ways proposers can misrepresent information. In 
particular, we compare explicit deception, whereby proposers explicitly communicate 
the drawn allocation together with the offer, to implicit deception, whereby proposers 
convey such information solely through offers. While explicit and implicit deception 
have been studied separately in bargaining games (e.g., Boles, et al., 2000; Mitzkewitz 
and Nagel, 1993), no prior study presents a direct comparison. 
We conduct a laboratory experiment using an ultimatum game in which the size 
of the allocation (w) can vary between a low amount, wL, and a high amount, wH, with 
equal probability – i.e., p(w = wL) = p(w = wH) = 0.5. The proposer is informed of the 
allocation, while the responder knows nothing beyond the prior. The proposer then 
makes an offer contingent on the allocation, x(w), 0 ≤ x ≤ w, which the responder either 
accepts or rejects. If we let a denote the responder’s decision to accept (a = 1) or reject 
(a = 0), the proposer’s payoff is πP = a(w - x), while the responder’s payoff is πR = ax. 
                                                 
1 Neurological data suggest that lying requires both a moral disinhibition and the cognitive ability to keep 
track of untrue statements (Yang, et al., 2005). Thus, the determinants of lying may be more complicated 
than of simple moral preferences.   
2 Tingley and Wang (2010) review the literature on sequential bargaining with one- or two-sided 
incomplete information and Croson et al. (2003) on one- and two-sided incomplete information in 
ultimatum games. Several theoretical papers on bargaining with incomplete information focus on 
mechanisms to achieve efficiency (e.g., Sanchez-Pages, 2011; Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere, 2002).   
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 In such situations, responders averse to unfavorable inequality (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) may be unable to perceive the inequality that results from a particular 
offer, due to the informational asymmetry. Thus, a proposer who draws a large 
allocation can obtain higher payoffs when the responder believes that the allocation may 
be small, by making uninformative offers that convey no information. Additionally, 
with explicit lying, the proposer can send uninformative “small pie” messages 
regardless of the allocation size. Therefore, explicit deception involves a misleading or 
an unambiguously false statement in addition to the information conveyed, implicitly, 
through an uninformative offer. For the purposes of deceiving the responder, this 
additional step is strategically irrelevant, since it requires only sending an additional 
uninformative message.  
However, there are reasons to believe that behavior and outcomes may differ 
when proposers deceive implicitly compared with when they must do so explicitly. For 
instance, prior research on deception and dishonesty shows that people will often forgo 
making explicitly false statements, as if they experience an internal psychological cost 
to lying (Gibson, Tanner, and Wagner, 2012; Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006). Thus, even if the ability to deceive and the monetary gain from doing so are 
equivalent between situations involving explicit and implicit deception, the willingness 
to deceive may be lower with explicit deception. 
Another way in which behavior and outcomes may differ when deception is 
explicit versus implicit is in the response of the party being deceived. For example, if 
the responder in the ultimatum game is convinced more easily that the allocation is 
small when also receiving a deceptive message than when solely receiving a small offer, 
the potential benefit from acting deceptively for the proposer can also be greater. Thus, 
proposers may find it easier to mislead responders when they do so explicitly, rather 
than implicitly.  
Our experiment compares bargaining behavior and outcomes across conditions 
involving explicit and implicit deception. We particularly focus on offers under wL and 
wH allocations in each condition. We study the difference between offers for the two 
allocations, as a measure of the informativeness of offers regarding the actual allocation. 
As another measure of deceptive proposals, we study the percentage of offers that are 
greater than half of the small allocation, as these send a strong signal that the allocation 
is large.  We also study whether (small) offers are accepted, implying successful 
deception, differentially across conditions. Finally, we vary the size of the large 
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allocation to explore whether the willingness to deceive, implicitly or explicitly, is 
affected by the potential monetary gains from doing so.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
Sessions took place at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
For each session, 16 participants were recruited via e-mail from the student populations 
of the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University.   
At the beginning of a session, participants drew cards with letters “A” (proposer) 
and “B” (responder), and were seated separately by roles. They received written 
instructions read aloud by the experimenter.  
In each of six experimental conditions the basic two-player ultimatum game with 
asymmetric information described earlier was repeated for 10 rounds with random re-
matching and no pairing repeated in consecutive rounds. In every round one of two 
possible allocations, wH and wL, was drawn with equal probability. The proposer alone 
observed the draw (w) and then made an offer, in ten-cent increments between $0 and 
w, to the responder, who either accepted or rejected this proposal. Payoffs were as 
described earlier. The true allocations were never revealed to responders, to reduce the 
detection of lying. At the end of the experiment, the software selected one round at 
random for payment, additional to a $6 participation fee.  
Our main treatment varies the channels available to the proposer for 
communicating about the allocation. A No Message condition (implicit deception) 
proceeded as above. Our experiment also included two explicit deception conditions. In 
a Message condition, the proposer sent a message corresponding to one of the two 
possible values of w – i.e., “wL” or “wH” – to the responder, along with the offer. A 
Message & Promise condition further added the possibility of sending a promise that 
the message was true. This (seemingly trivial) opportunity may increase the 
psychological costs to lying for proposers relative to simply sending deceptive messages 
or may increase the willingness of responders to believe deceptive messages. 
The small allocation (wL) was always $10 while the large allocation (wH) varied. 
In a High Stakes condition it was $20, while in a Low Stakes condition it was $14.  
The experiment therefore consisted of six conditions, 3 (No Message; Message; 
Message & Promise) X 2 (High Stakes, Low Stakes).  Each subject participated in only 
one condition.  
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Following the final round, participants completed two questionnaires measuring 
a propensity to engage in unethical behavior for personal gains, the Mach-IV test of 
Machiavellianism (Christie and Geis, 1970) and the Self-Reported Inappropriate 
Negotiations Strategies scale (SINS) (Robinson, Lewicki, and Donahue, 2000). The 
experiment then concluded with payment. 
 
3. Results 
We conducted a total of 18 sessions, 3 for each condition, with a total of 288 
participants, 144 in the role of proposer. Our analysis focuses on testing the null 
hypothesis that behavior and outcomes do not differ between the three message 
conditions, across which the ability to deceive is theoretically identical. 
 
Offers 
Figure 1 shows the average offers across time, separately for low (wL) and high 
allocations (wH) in each condition, with High (Low) Stakes conditions in the top 
(bottom) panels. To lessen variation due to idiosyncratic subject behavior interacting 
with random allocation draws, we pool across two-period blocks. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
  
First, we consider whether the difference between offers for low and high 
allocations, a measure of the informativeness of offers, differs across conditions. Small-
allocation offers are roughly the same in all conditions. However, the gap with offers 
under high allocations is smallest in the middle column, the Message condition, and 
roughly equally large for No Message (left) and Message and Promise (right).  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
 This pattern is confirmed in the regressions reported in Table 1, which test, 
separately for the High and Low stakes conditions, the effects of message conditions on 
offers, including subject-level random effects and clustering of standard errors. The 
constant term measures the size of small-allocation offers in the No Message condition. 
Consistent with prior research, mean offers are generally slightly below half of the small 
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allocation. The additional effect for the Message and Message & Promise conditions, 
measured by the respective coefficients, are not statistically significant.   
 In the No Message condition, high-allocation offers are significantly higher than 
those for low allocations, by about $1.90 and $0.49, respectively, for High and Low 
stakes. Thus, when implicit deception is possible, proposers do not fully exploit their 
informational advantage by making entirely uninformative offers. Instead, proposers 
offered, on average, between 12 and 19 percent of the additional surplus of a high 
allocation.  
 The coefficients on Allocation High X Message Conditions are negative, and 
statistically significant for high stakes. This confirms our observation from Figure 1 of 
smaller offer difference between low and high allocations with explicit messages.  
 Adding promises creates another reversal, in the direction of less deception. The 
coefficients for Allocation High X Message & Promise Condition – which capture the 
marginal effect of adding promises to the Message Condition – are positive and 
statistically significant, consistent with an interpretation of increased lying costs for 
explicit deception when promises are possible. 
 We can also explore differences between high- and low-allocation offers at the 
individual subject level. Figures 2A and 2B present each proposer’s average offers 
across rounds, separately for small ($10, x-axis) and large allocations ($20 or $14, y-
axis), for the High and Low Stakes conditions. The different markers indicate the 
message conditions. 
 
(Insert Figures 2A and 2B here) 
 
The figures show, first, that many observations are clustered around the 
midpoint of $5 for both allocations, corresponding to cases in which proposers offered 
half of the small allocation, regardless of the actual allocation size. Second, where 
observations depart from the 45-degree line, they tend to be above it, corresponding to 
proposers making higher offers when the allocation is high than when it is low and thus 
potentially conveying information to responders about the actual allocation size. 
Third, departures from the diagonal tend to be larger and more frequent in the 
No Message and Message & Promise conditions than in the Message condition. This 
confirms what we found earlier. Offers are less informative when they are accompanied 
by a message than when they are not and than when the message can include a promise.  
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In the On-line Appendix, we present further evidence that, at the level of 
individual behavior, high- and low-allocation offer differences are greater in the No 
Message and Message & Promise conditions.3 We also show that individual personality 
differences measured using psychometric scales predict the willingness of proposers to 
act deceptively by making uninformative offers.4 
 Our analysis thus far uses differences between high- and low-allocation offers, 
i.e., a measure of how informative offers are about allocations, to identify the extent to 
which proposers behave deceptively across conditions. However, we can also test the 
extent to which we find similar results using other measures. To this end, we compare 
the frequency of high-allocation offers that are strictly greater than $5 as an alternative 
measure of non-deceptive behavior. Since offers of half the allocation are equitable and 
rarely rejected in ultimatum games (e.g., Camerer, 2003, Chapter 2), offers above one-
half of the small allocation can be interpreted as sending the responder clear information 
that the allocation must be above $10 (wL). By this measure, we again observe more 
“honest” behavior in the No Message and Message & Promise conditions (30 and 31 
percent, respectively) than in the Message condition (16 percent). 
 
Messages & Promises 
We next study the frequency with which proposers engaged in explicit deception 
in the conditions with messages. Figure 3 presents the frequencies of honest and 
dishonest messages and promises across the two Message conditions for cases in which 
the allocation was high (low allocations are omitted as corresponding messages were 
overwhelmingly honest). Honest messages are twice as frequent in the Message & 
Promise condition as in the Message condition. The proportion of subjects who send 
dishonest messages accompanied by promises (65 percent) is lower than those who send 
dishonest messages in the Message condition (89 percent). This is consistent with our 
earlier inference, based on offers, that dishonest behavior is less frequent when promises 
are possible than when they are not.  
 
                                                 
3 For example, we look at all the offers made by individual proposers, and classify subjects according to 
whether their high- and low-allocation offer differences are statistically detectable. Roughly five times as 
many proposers make informative offers, according to this criterion, in the No Message and Message & 
Promise conditions as in the Message condition. 
4 Specifically, proposers who rate dishonest negotiation tactics as less appropriate, using the Self-
Reported Inappropriate Negotiations Strategies (SINS) survey (Robinson, et al., 2000), also tend to 
exhibit greater large- vs. small-allocation offer differences, particularly in the No Message and Message 
& Promise conditions. 
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(Insert Figures 3 and 4 here) 
 
Figure 4 shows the mean offers, by message, condition, and stake size. Offers 
are clearly higher after a “High” message than after a “Low” message, and each such 
pairwise comparison is statistically significant.5  
Importantly, there are also no differences in offers, conditional on the message 
sent, between the Message or Message & Promise conditions. That is, the first and third 
bars are equal, as are the second and fourth bar, etc., with no significant difference in 
any such pairwise comparisons. Thus the earlier observation of offer differences 
between the two message conditions comes from the additional deception in the 
Message condition. 
 
Rejections 
Figures 5A (High Stakes) and 5B (Low Stakes) show rejection rates for different 
offer ranges, by message condition.6 Offers of $4 or less are rejected most frequently in 
the No Message conditions and least frequently in the Message & Promise conditions. 
For higher offers, rejections fall considerably with only small differences across 
conditions. Table 2 presents (subject) random-effects probit regressions of rejections, 
using offer and conditions as explanatory variables. We find a negative and significant 
offer coefficient. Also, rejections are significantly less frequent in the Message & 
Promise condition for low offers, but the difference diminishes as offers increase (i.e., 
the interaction between offer and Message & Promise condition is positive). 
 
(Insert Figures 5A and 5B and Table 2 here) 
 
 Interestingly, rejection rates in the Message & Promise condition do not differ 
significantly depending on whether or not a promise was made. For example, offers 
between $0 and $4 that follow a message claiming a small allocation (wL) are rejected 
35 percent of the time with a promise and 31 percent of the time without one. Thus, the 
possibility of using promises, rather than their actual use, appears to decrease the 
                                                 
5 We conduct regressions of offer on message, for each message condition and stake size and with 
subject-level random effects and standard errors clustered by subject. In each case, the coefficient on 
message equals “High” is positive and statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
6 The categories were determined by finding the smallest range for which each of the six conditions had at 
least 20 offers. The resulting classification relies on whole dollar amounts due to the high frequencies of 
offers at these points. 
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frequency of rejections. This is also supported by models 2 and 4 in Table 2, which 
including binary variables for whether a promise was made); the introduction of this 
variable is largely inconsequential. 
 
Earnings 
 Finally, we consider how earnings differed by condition. Figure 6 presents 
proposers’ average earnings by condition. For both High and Low stakes, proposers 
earn the most money in the Message condition, when they can send messages without 
the option of a promise. This is consistent with our earlier observation that deception is 
highest in the Message condition.  
Table 3 reports (subject) random-effects regressions of earnings. As models 1 
and 4 reveal, the above difference is statistically significant in the Low stakes 
conditions, but not in the High stakes conditions. 
 Models 2 and 5 add a variable identifying allocation size, and interact it with 
condition. Not surprisingly, proposers earn more when the allocation is high. Moreover, 
the interactions reveal that proposers earn more from high allocations when they can 
send messages, and less when the messages can include promises, but these effects are 
not always statistically significant.  
Finally, models 3 and 6 include a proposer’s SINS score (Robinson, et al., 2000), 
a psychological survey-based measure of willingness to engage in deceptive behavior in 
negotiations, and its interaction with whether the allocation is high. Consistent with 
analysis in the On-line Appendix, proposers who score higher on the SINS scale benefit 
from more strategic offers and earn more of the high allocation.7 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Our paper studies implicit and explicit deception in bargaining situations with 
asymmetric information. From a standard game theoretic perspective, a proposer’s 
strategic ability to deceive a responder is equivalent, regardless of whether proposers 
can send messages or make promises. When proposers act deceptively, offers, messages 
and promises are all uninformative. Our study explores whether, for psychological 
                                                 
7 The On-line Appendix reports corresponding analyses for responder earnings. The results generally 
show a consistent, and inverted, pattern. For example, responders earn less of the high allocation in the 
Message condition, but more when promises are possible. However, the treatment effects on responder 
earnings are generally weaker than for proposers. 
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reasons, these distinct ways of engaging in deception may result in different behaviors 
and bargaining outcomes. 
Our results clearly reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
different communication conditions. Providing the opportunity to send a promise leads 
to less dishonest messages and more informative offers. Thus, the opportunity to make 
promises likely increases the psychological cost of lying and thereby mitigates 
dishonest behavior.  
However, when comparing a situation in which deception is done through 
actions alone (implicit deception, in the No Message condition) with one in which it is 
done through actions and messages (explicit deception, in the Message condition), there 
is significantly greater misrepresentation in the latter. That is, our proposers find it 
psychologically easier to make deceptive offers when they send messages without the 
opportunity to make promises. The result is that the condition in which they send 
messages alone is the most profitable for proposers in that it allows them to capture the 
greater share of surplus produced by high allocations. 
We also find that a scale, used in psychological and negotiations research, to 
measure a willingness to act dishonestly in bargaining contexts has predictive power for 
identifying which proposers are willing to use their strategic advantage to act 
deceptively and to obtain higher earnings. This suggests that such scales might be a 
valuable complement to choice data in identifying which individuals are likely to 
respond to behavioral contextual influences. 
We also observe that responders react differently to different kinds of potential 
deception. In particular, they reject low offers less frequently in conditions in which 
proposers can make promises, even when such promises are not actually made.   
While our work leaves open the precise psychological mechanisms that drive the 
behavioral differences across conditions, we make an important contribution by 
showing that even when holding informational asymmetry constant, the type of 
deception opportunities available can be important in determining whether one 
ultimately acts dishonestly.8 Thus, consistent with other research in behavioral 
economics we show that how one gets to an outcome can be as important as the 
outcome itself, particularly in the extent to which it triggers different norms of what is 
                                                 
8 This result has some similarities with the findings of Cain et al. (2005), who show that disclosing 
conflicts of interest allows conflicted advisors to feel more licensed to provide self-serving advice. In 
both cases, the ability to disclose information makes it easier for individuals to act unfairly. 
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and is not appropriate behavior (e.g., Brandts and Sola, 2001; Krupka and Weber, 
forthcoming; Gino et al., forthcoming). 
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Table 1. Regressions of offers on condition 
 (1) 
High Stakes 
($10 / $20) 
(2) 
Low Stakes 
($10 / $14) 
Dependent variable: offer 
Message Conditions 
0.388 
(0.258) 
0.056 
(0.205) 
Message & Promise Condition 
-0.255 
(0.169) 
-0.257 
(0.230) 
Allocation High (wH) 
1.917*** 
(0.375) 
0.494*** 
(0.233) 
Allocation High  
X Message Conditions 
-1.203*** 
(0.416) 
-0.254 
(0.261) 
Allocation High  
X Message & Promise Condition 
0.677*** 
(0.352) 
0.565*** 
(0.206) 
Period 
0.026 
(0.025) 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
Constant 
4.203*** 
(0.292) 
4.780*** 
(0.216) 
R2 0.170 0.056 
Observations 720 720 
Number of subjects 72 72 
 
Data from proposers only 
Includes (subject) random effects; robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Table 2. Probit regressions of rejection decisions 
Dependent variable:  
Offer rejected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
High Stakes ($10 / $20) Low Stakes ($10 / $14) 
Offer -1.227
*** 
(0.212) 
-1.228*** 
(0.212) 
-1.507*** 
(0.228) 
-1.502*** 
(0.227) 
Message Condition -0.0270 (1.244) 
-0.0277 
(1.244) 
-0.816 
(1.239) 
-0.804 
(1.236) 
Message & Promise Condition -3.995
*** 
(1.104) 
-4.079*** 
(1.141) 
-3.903*** 
(0.990) 
-3.712*** 
(1.040) 
Offer X 
Message Condition 
0.0354 
(0.272) 
0.0356 
(0.272) 
0.199 
(0.283) 
0.196 
(0.282) 
Offer X 
Message & Promise Condition 
0.841*** 
(0.232) 
0.834*** 
(0.233) 
0.871*** 
(0.215) 
0.864*** 
(0.215) 
Promise made  0.127 (0.421)  
-0.191 
(0.323) 
Constant 4.115
*** 
(0.924) 
4.117*** 
(0.925) 
5.366*** 
(0.923) 
5.348*** 
(0.921) 
Log likelihood -212.47 -212.42 -225.84 -225.66 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
Number of subjectID 72 72 72 72 
 
Data from responders only 
Includes (subject) random effects; robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Table 3. Regressions of proposer earnings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: 
Earnings High Stakes Conditions Low Stakes Conditions 
Message Conditions 0.460 (0.533) 
0.194 
(0.285) 
0.179 
(0.287) 
0.745*** 
(0.323) 
0.202 
(0.303) 
0.222 
(0.316) 
Promise Condition -0.406 (0.516) 
0.444*** 
(0.261) 
0.468*** 
(0.263) 
-0.269 
(0.283) 
0.0876 
(0.288) 
0.0834 
(0.290) 
High Allocation  8.638
*** 
(0.507) 
6.543*** 
(0.921)  
3.041*** 
(0.388) 
2.124*** 
(0.659) 
Message Conditions  
X High Allocation  
0.488 
(0.723) 
0.740 
(0.670)  
0.968*** 
(0.526) 
0.741 
(0.525) 
Promise Condition  
X High Allocation  
-1.249*** 
(0.758) 
-1.548*** 
(0.729)  
-0.406 
(0.469) 
-0.245 
(0.480) 
SINS score   -0.0672 (0.0820)   
-0.048 
(0.103) 
SINS score 
X High Allocation   
0.669*** 
(0.256)   
0.376*** 
(0.194) 
Constant 7.894
*** 
(0.367) 
3.863*** 
(0.214) 
4.067*** 
(0.368) 
5.325*** 
(0.272) 
3.830*** 
(0.235) 
3.952*** 
(0.309) 
R2 0.001 0.603 0.609 0.009 0.298 0.304 
Observations 720 720 720 720 720 720 
Number of subjectID 72 72 72 72 72 72 
 
Data from proposers only 
Includes (subject) random effects; robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Figure 1. Mean offers by condition and allocation size 
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Figure 2A. Proposers’ average offers by allocation size and condition (High Stakes) 
 
Figure 2B. Proposers’ average offers by allocation size and condition (Low Stakes) 
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Figure 3. Proportions of Dishonest Messages and Promises by Condition 
 
 
Figure 4. Offers by Message Sent and Condition 
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Figure 5A. Rejection frequency by Offer Range and Condition (High Stakes) 
 
 
Figure 5B. Rejection frequency by Offer Range and Condition (Low Stakes) 
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Figure 6. Mean proposer earnings by condition 
  
 
 i 
Material for On-line Appendix: Additional Analysis  
 
A1. Analysis of Individual Behavior 
Figures A1a and A1b show the average difference between offers made for the 
high allocation (w = wH) and low allocation (w = wL), calculated at the subject level and 
then averaged across subjects in a condition. In both High and Low stakes conditions, 
proposers’ offers differ to a greater extent, indicating more informative offers, in the No 
Message and in the Message & Promise conditions than in the Message condition. 
We also explore behavior at the individual level by testing the extent to which 
each participant in the role of proposer offered different amounts for w = wL and for w = 
wH. For each condition, Table A1 reports the number and proportion of participants for 
whom we can statistically reject the null hypothesis, x(wH) = x(wL), in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis, x(wH) > x(wL), using a one-tailed t-test with the 10 offers made 
by that participant. That is, the table answers the question: How many proposers in each 
condition make offers that convey statistically reliable information about the allocation 
(even with small numbers of observations)? 
Consistent with the analysis in the main text, a greater proportion of proposers’ 
behavior conveys information about the allocation size in the No Message and Message 
& Promise conditions than in the Message condition. Looking at the combined data, 
roughly five times as many proposers make significantly different offers in the former 
two conditions than in the latter. This difference is more extreme for High Stakes, but 
the pattern is also present in the Low Stakes conditions. 
 We next explore whether deceptive behavior correlates with individual 
characteristics, using a scale developed from the Self-Reported Inappropriate 
Negotiations Strategies survey (SINS; Robinson, et al., 2000), administered at the end 
of the experiment. The survey consists of ratings of the appropriateness of negotiation 
tactics, such as, “In return for concessions from your opponent now, offer to make 
future concessions which you know you will not follow through on.” The survey has 30 
items; however, we use a 7-item scale obtained by combining two sub-scales, relevant 
for our experiment, False Promises (3 items) and Misrepresentation (4 items).9 
                                                 
9 We also conducted this analysis with the Mach-IV test of Machiavellianism (Christie and Geis, 1970), 
and particularly with the Positive Interpersonal and Negative Interpersonal sub-scales. We find 
qualitatively similar results to those we report here, particularly for the Positive Interpersonal scale. 
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 We divided proposers into those scoring above and below average on the SINS 
sub-scale, labeling them as “High SINS” and “Low SINS”, respectively. Figures A2a 
and A2b are comparable to Figures A1a and A1b, examining these two subsamples 
separately. The figures reveal stronger offer differences for Low SINS proposers, who 
rate deceptive tactics as less appropriate. High SINS proposers generally engage in 
more misrepresentation across conditions, being thus less sensitive to the negotiation 
conditions.10 Of course, this part of our analysis is largely exploratory and requires 
further study before drawing definitive conclusions. 
 
A2. Analysis of Responder Earnings 
 Figure A3 and Table A2 report analyses for responder earnings that correspond 
to those in Figure 6 and Table 3 in the paper. Figure A3 reveals that there are no 
substantial treatment differences in responder earnings, which is confirmed by models 1 
and 3 in Table A2. As models 2 and 4 show, however, responders earn less of the high 
allocation in the message conditions and more in the Promise condition. These 
differences are inversely related to those in Table 3, which indicates that the Message 
condition shifts the high allocation surplus from the responders to the proposers, who 
are able to capture a greater share when they send messages. This is reversed when 
proposers can include promises with their messages. All of these effects are consistent 
with our analyses of proposer earnings and behavior. 
   
                                                 
10 Regression analysis, not reported here, confirms that the interactions in Figures A1a and A1b are 
consistent across both High and Low stakes conditions, though they are larger and statistically significant 
only in the High stakes conditions. 
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Table A1. Proportion of proposers making different offers by allocation 
 No Message Message Message & 
Promise 
High Stakes ($10/$20) 11 (46%) 1 (4%) 11 (46%) 
Low Stakes ($10/$14) 6 (25%) 3 (13%) 8 (35%)a 
Combined 17 (35%) 4 (8%) 19 (40%) 
Subjects classified by whether a t-test rejects x(wH) = x(wL) in favor of x(wH) >= x(wL). 
Data from proposers only; data includes 24 participants per condition, except for (a) where one subject 
was omitted because w = wL only once in the 10 periods. 
 
 
Table A2. Regressions of responder earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: earnings High Stakes Conditions Low Stakes Conditions 
Message Conditions -0.210 (0.243) 
0.499 
(0.317) 
0.0554 
(0.221) 
0.140 
(0.294) 
Promise Condition 0.031 (0.222) 
-0.111 
(0.288) 
0.152 
(0.225) 
-0.149 
(0.298) 
High Allocation  2.607
*** 
(0.326)  
0.813*** 
(0.308) 
Message Conditions X High 
Allocation  
-1.528*** 
(0.401)  
-0.192 
(0.371) 
Promise Condition X High 
Allocation  
0.408 
(0.352)  
0.700*** 
(0.303) 
Constant 4.690
*** 
(0.213) 
3.473*** 
(0.255) 
4.108*** 
(0.159) 
3.708*** 
(0.196) 
R2 0.001 0.130 0.002 0.047 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
Number of subjectID 72 72 72 72 
 
Data from responders only 
Includes (subject) random effects; robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Figure A1a. Mean difference between offers for high and low allocations (High 
Stakes) 
 
 
Figure A1b. Mean difference between offers for high and low allocations (Low 
Stakes) 
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Figure A2a. Mean Offer Difference between Low and High Allocations by 
Condition and SINS score (High Stakes) 
 
Figure A2b. Mean Offer Difference between Low and High Allocations by 
Condition and SINS score (Low Stakes) 
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Figure A3. Mean responder earnings by condition 
 
 
 
